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Abstract: This talk offers a collection of vignettes that position the relation between 
life and death as a central but unsolvable question for theorization in art and politics. 
Indeed, what to think of death in times when, yet again, the end of the world as we 
know it seems to be near? 
Introduction 
In his seminal essay “Necropolitics,” philosopher and political scientist Achille Mbembe 
writes, 
contemporary experiences of human destruction suggest that it is possible to develop 
a reading of politics, sovereignty, and the subject different from the one we inherited 
from the philosophical discourse of modernity. Instead of considering reason as the 
truth of the subject, we can look to other foundational categories that are less abstract 
and more tactile, such as life and death. (Mbembe, 2003, p. 14) 
In “Necropolitics,” Mbembe famously extends Michel Foucault’s thesis according to which 
modern sovereignty finds its basis in biopower, that is, that human life as such has become the 
primary domain for exercising productive power (“making live and letting die” [biopower] 
contra “letting live and making die” [authoritarian power in Roman law]). Mbembe argues 
that in addition to examining the various ways that biopower makes life, we should also pay 
attention how it manifests itself as a systematic destruction of human beings (as necropower) 
(for Mbembe, the history of colonies is the primary example of necropower as sovereignty. 
(“under conditions of necropower [death-worlds, as Mbembe calls them], the lines between 
resistance and suicide, sacrifice and redemption, martyrdom and freedom are blurred” 
[Mbembe, 2003, p. 40]) 
The reason why I wanted to start with this quote is that I remain puzzled by Mbembe’s claim 
that life and death are somehow “less abstract and more tactile” categories for political 
thought than reason. Here, I’m not suggesting that life and death are mere abstractions: 
indeed, bodies, living or dead, are here, in this world (of course, reason is here too, but 
differently…). Rather, I see that in order to make use of life and death as “foundational 
categories” for politics today (a claim that I do agree with), I see that we should also approach 
their limits; those moments when life and death don’t form a clear binary pair that would let 
us define the concreteness that makes them less abstract. 
The title of this talk, “Death is all things we see awake; all we see asleep is sleep” (Kahn, 
1981, p. 69 [fragment LXXXIX]) unfolds the kind of approach to relationship between life 
and death that I’m interested in developing in response to Mbembe’s claim. It is one of the 
fragments that have survived from the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus (the so-called 
weeping philosopher, best know for his phrase “everything flows”), whose thought united the 
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opposites, often in an obscure and paradoxical way.1 Like for Mbembe, here death presents 
itself as a foundational and concrete category (it is “all things that we see”); however, it is 
removed from its usual companion, its twin brother Sleep (Hypnos) who so often gives death 
its familiar appearance (silence and passivity; note: I do acknowledge that actual sleeping 
involves quite a lot of activity; my point is directed toward the idea of sleep as passivity as in 
political emancipation as a moment of “waking up;”). This means that our relation with death 
involves a state of being “awake,” while sleeping is just sleeping (but, we still find them next 
to each other). It is this simultaneous affirmation of connection and disconnection that 
interests me; especially when approaching the concreteness of life and death that Mbembe 
argues for. 
Indeed, how death becomes present to us? In this talk, I approach this question in three parts, 
mainly focusing on how death oscillates between the concrete and the abstract. What seems 
to drive this oscillation is the question of agency: that is, death as a likely end of agency, or, at 
least, as its troubling horizon (note: for those who immediately think of Heidegger here, I’ll 
just say that I’ve left him out of this paper). To oversimplify, death is that strange passageway 
that turns subjects into objects. But, as I will argue later, sometimes dead bodies were never 
subjects in the first place, at least in the eyes of Law; for European Union, a dead body 
washed to the shores of Greece or Italy is just a nameless body, sleeping its eternal sleep. 
However, a human body is never just a body, not even in cases of systematic mass 
destructions that Mbembe refers to: a dead body stands for something, it manifests a 
discontinuation, an end of a particular kind of agency and an affirmation of its finitude. This 
means that we always start to discuss about something else than just the body. So, my point is 
that the concreteness of death is never reducible to a dead body and a dead body never makes 
death lose its abstractness entirely. 
While the focus of this talk is mainly on human death, the question of agency inevitably 
connects to the non-human modalities of death, specifically the end of the world as the death 
of the world. If, following thinkers like Jane Bennett and Timothy Morton, the age of the 
Anthropocene requires radically different approaches the world than the ones that are based 
on subject/object, passive/active, living/non-living dichotomies (that is, approaches that 
radically decenter human life from this equation), I claim that, following my previous 
argument, we certainly could include death in this discussion as well. This could help us to 
approach the contested ground between the human and the non-human without having to 
assign quasi-metaphysical life-agency to objects. Death is, after all, radically non-human 
while being simultaneously something that humans desperately want to own. 
To talk about death means that we talk about something that we have not experienced or, in 
some cases, have almost experienced. This is why we are doomed to talk about death always in 
relation to life. However, in order to introduce a level of inaccessibility to life as well, I will 
focus my discussion on the concept of immortality, that is, the idea of defeating death. I see 
the search of immortality is an attempt par excellence to own death and make it measurable 
with human finitude and agency (was this agency understood in secular or spiritual terms). In 
                                               
1 For example, “Immortals are mortal, mortals immortal, living the others' death, dead in the 
others' life.” (Kahn, 1981, p. 71 [fragment XCII]) 
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Heracleitan spirit, I will push immortality and mortality toward each other and hopefully 
unfold the abstractness in their concreteness and their concreteness in their abstractness. 
 
Part 1: Curing Death 
A few years ago, Google announced that they are financing a research unit called Calico 
(shortened from California Life Company), whose mission “to harness advanced technologies 
to increase our understanding of the biology that controls lifespan.” 
(http://www.calicolabs.com) This project, publicly accessible only through a nebulous 
website, made the headlines as Google’s attempt to cure death. 
Google is certainly not alone in this quest. In fact, there is an international organization 
called The Immortality Institute (they also call themselves LongeCity) whose mission is “to 
conquer the blight of involuntary death” 
(http://www.longecity.org/forum/page/index2.html/_/feature/about-r28). One of the 
researchers associated with this organization is Aubrey de Grey, a researcher at Cambridge 
University, who has written a few books and given a plenty of TED talks on his visions of 
overcoming aging and death (in fact, he has declared a “war on aging”, [de Gray, 2004]).  
Having a background in computer science, de Grey has a very practical approach to the 
relation between life and death. When asked in an interview why would he like to live 
forever, he responded: 
It's not really a matter of living forever, it's just a matter of not wanting to die. One 
doesn't live forever all in one go, one lives forever one year at a time. It's just a case of 
"Well, life seems to be fun, and I don't see any prospect of it ceasing to be fun unless 
I get frail and miserable and start declining." So if I can avoid declining, I'll stay with 
it really. (http://www.livescience.com/6967-hang-25-year-wait-immortality.html) 
For me, these peculiar statements about immortality offer an intriguing starting point for 
thinking death and its relation to human agency today. Here, I’m not interested in simply 
repeating the argument (put forward by people like Philippe Ariès) that death is excluded and 
hidden from societal life in modernity. While this might be true, I’m more interested in this 
desire to overcome (not simply hide) death, that is, to strip it away from its necessity; and how 
might this connect to the social, economical, and political climate of contemporary 
capitalism. 
So, what can we say about overcoming death in this context? Notably, one of de Grey’s central 
arguments for the war on aging is that aging is expensive; both for the aging person and for 
the society. So, this opens up an interesting biopolitical twist on the current austerity politics: 
one does not have to have merely an entrepreneurial spirit, but a body, too: a body that can 
“stay with life” and thus reduce its societal costs. 
This means that in a true (neo)liberalist spirit, both Calico’s attempt to supervise the “biology 
that controls lifespan” and de Grey’s “war on aging” turn the relation between life and death 
into a matter of choice. Thus, overcoming death means choosing life. 
What is interesting about this choice is that it’s not merely about choosing not to end 
someone’s life (as Katharine Hamnett’s WHAM t-shirt originally promoted; that is, don’t 
kill yourself or others), but it’s more about choosing not to cease living. For de Grey, for whom 
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“it's reasonable to suppose that one could oscillate between being biologically 20 and 
biologically 25 indefinitely,” human life seems to be potentially an infinite resource and we’re 
obliged to make sure that this resource can be used properly. 
So, here the ability to choose is directly related to a specific understanding of agency as 
personal freedom: since I own my life, I own the rights to be in control of it. Aging and 
biological death are, then, something like big government for the Right: an unjust taxman 
who takes away the life that belongs to me. Deciding to continue one’s life limitlessly would 
be, then, an ultimate manifestation of such freedom.  
What does this freedom mean, then? When asked what he would do with his infinite 
lifespan, de Grey replied: 
They say variety is the spice of life, so I don't think I would do the same things every 
day. I'd like to be able to spend more time reading, and listen to music, and all that 
sort of thing, things that I never get to do at all at the moment. 
(http://www.livescience.com/6967-hang-25-year-wait-immortality.html) 
Interestingly enough, de Grey’s words bring in mind young Marx and his famous passage in 
German Ideology where he states that in a communist society one can “do one thing today and 
another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, 
criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, 
shepherd or critic” (Tucker, 1978, p. 160). While Marx targeted his words against the 
distribution of labor in capitalist societies (that is, it is the distribution of labor that prevents 
us from doing all these things), de Grey’s target is much more cosmological: it’s not 
capitalism, but death that keeps us from actualizing our true potentials. On this cosmological 
scale, however, my life as my choice does not coincide with other lives; my life is not 
supported by other lives except my choice to live (here, one can think of Ayn Rand). Since I 
want to live, I don’t deserve to die. 
What if we relocated the argument for infinite lifespans to, let’s say, miners digging cobalt by 
hand in unregulated mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo (cf. Amnesty International, 
2016)? What would the task “to conquer the blight of involuntary death” mean for them and 
how does their choice to live differ from de Grey’s? Or, perhaps most importantly, what is the 
relation between de Grey’s desire for infinite lifespan and those miners who suffer from 
chronic lung problems and body aches that eventually kill them (if the collapsing mines don’t 
get them first)?  
Anthropologist and critical theorist Elizabeth Povinelli (2011) has examined similar 
questions when discussing the ethical and temporal landscape of late liberalism, focusing 
mainly in Australia. She is particularly interested in how forms of biopolitical 
governmentality affect not only how Australian aborigines are treated as subjects of 
legislation, but also how it affects their bodies that, in many cases, are slowly decaying from 
chronic sores, heart, kidney, or lung failures, alcohol abuse, and ineffective medication. She 
talks about “states of letting die” (coming close to Mbembe) that privatize and individualize 
these forms of decay and turn them into consequences of bad choices: it is the Aborigines 
themselves who are choosing their death by alcohol, cancer, or whatever happens to kill them. 
The only life that the Australian government allows them to choose is the one that is based 
on assimilation: in order to make the right kind of choices, they have to let go of their own 
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ways of life (imbued with bad choices) and adapt themselves to the entrepreneurial spirit and 
body that “stays with life.” 
By drawing from Ursula Le Guin’s short story “The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas,” a 
short story about a utopian city of Omelas where the heavenly bliss of its citizens is directly 
related to the incarceration of a “feeble-minded” child in a broom closet (in the story, 
everybody knows about this child, so it’s not some sort of a dark ideological secret that ought 
to be uncovered), Povinelli links the temporal and ethical structure of these right kind of 
choices to what she calls “future anterior,” meaning, 
I am not in you. You are not in me. We are merely playing the same game of chance 
whose truth lies not here and now between us but there and then in who wins and who 
loses. No one is killing me. I am killing myself. Maybe . . . we’ll see . . . the future 
will tell. (Povinelli, 2008, p. 517, emphasis mine) 
So, if, according to Calico and the Immortality Institute, the authorship over one’s life 
necessitates a death sentence (one has to kill death as the idea of curing a disease and waging a 
war entail), could we also understand it in more concrete terms (following Mbembe)? In 
other words, what if this act killing was not some kind of abstract idea (indeed, how does one 
wage war on aging?), but something that manifests itself in actual human lives as forms of 
“letting die”? Since, following Povinelli, “letting die” is nothing spectacular (like tsunami or 
an earthquake) but a slow process of decaying, it lacks the kind of clear limits that would 
grant it the status of a proper event, a proper death. Indeed, this is precisely what makes the 
act of killing a state of dying: it merely happens (meaning, of course, that we’re not seemingly 
responsible of it). This is a death that seems to be much more difficult to conquer, since it 
remains in the “broom closet,” while being present in “all things we see.” 
To conquer death means, then: my choice to live is at the same time a death sentence to 
someone else. My choice to not be miserable requires that I allow someone else to be 
miserable. My quest for immortality is directly related to someone else’s mortality. 
These statements do not express a future-oriented causality (if… then…): here, life and death 
coincide; they both take place in the present, in “all things we see.” 
 
Part 2: Death Beyond Us 
Of course, the idea of defeating death is everything but new: historically, it is directly linked 
to the contested division between humans and gods and our seeming difficulty to accept the 
finitude of human life (and, indeed, the limits of our agency). Here, two obvious names come 
to mind: Gilgamesh and Jesus. 
Generally speaking, what differentiates Gilgamesh from Jesus is the notion of limits: while 
the epic of Gilgamesh is often read as a reminder that humans have a specific place in the 
cosmos; a place that is limited by time and space of the mortal world, the sacrificial death and 
resurrection of Jesus ensured that all mortals can reunite with their divine and eternal origin: 
following Jesus’ words in John 11:25-26: “I am the resurrection and the life. Those who 
believe in me, even though they die, will live, and everyone who lives and believes in me will 
never die” (NRSV). For Christians, then, the limitations of the mortal world (greatly detested 
by Gilgamesh) became merely temporary: it is faith (a spiritual connection with the eternity) 
that provides the key to eternal life after death (so, one does not have to travel to see 
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Utnapishtim like Gilgamesh did). Physical death was not a limit, but a passageway, a 
biological fact secondary to the divine plan. 
I’m not suggesting that Christianity totally abandoned limits that death introduces to human 
existence. Here it is important to make a distinction between two types of death in the New 
Testament by distinguishing two words for it in the original Greek: nekros, which usually 
denotes a dead body, and thanatos, which means death as such. For example, in Romans 6:9, 
one reads “We know that Christ, being raised from the dead [nekros/nekron], will never die 
[apothneskei; to put to death] again; death [thanatos] no longer has dominion over him” 
(NRSV)2.  
Thus, thanatos suggests that there is something about death that goes beyond a dead body: 
that is, something metaphysical, something that belongs to the domain of the soul. This is 
famously put forward in Matthew 10:28: “Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill 
the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell” (NRSV)3. Indeed, this 
passage suggests that humans are made of two elements, body and soul, the material and the 
immaterial, the ephemeral and the eternal, and that death means different things for both of 
these elements. 
Thus, unlike Gilgamesh, for whom death always reinstalled the division between the human 
and the divine (that the human world and the world of gods were not to coincide except 
through divine interventions like when gods created Enkidu or when they created the Great 
Flood), the Christian version of defeating death ultimately denotes the unification of the 
divine (eternal) and the profane (ephemeral) in eternal life (notably, it’s not quite clear what 
does this unification looks like; that is, does the soul get back its body or something else; see 
Thacker, 2011, p. 109). Subsequently, the so-called second death (that is, the death of the 
soul “in hell” that we find in the aforementioned passage from Matthew) means that the soul 
vanishes together with the material body: nothing remains left of the one who dies, neither 
the body nor the soul. 
In terms of the division between nekros and thanatos, one could say that by defeating thanatos, 
Jesus turned the age-old battle against death foundationally abstract: a body (living or dead) 
didn’t matter anymore (indeed, while for Gilgamesh the decaying dead body of his friend 
Enkidu was the primary reason to search for the immortal Utnapishmit, Jesus didn’t mind at 
all that Lazarus’ body stunk after being dead for four days). In this sense, the limit that death 
poses to us became also more abstract: it’s not merely the materiality of nekros that manifests 
this limit (a body that stinks and decays), but its immaterial, metaphysical excess, thanatos. 
                                               
2 In Greek, the passage goes, “εἰδότες ὅτι Χριστὸς ἐγερθεὶς ἐκ νεκρῶν οὐκέτι ἀποθνῄσκει; 
θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυριεύει,” where the death from where Jesus raised from is νεκρῶν 
(nekroi), the verb “die” is ἀποκτεῖναι (apokteinai, put to death), and the death that “no 
longer has dominion over him” is θάνατος (thanatos) 
3 καὶ µὴ φοβεῖσθε ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποκτεννόντων τὸ σῶµα, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν µὴ δυναµένων 
ἀποκτεῖναι; φοβεῖσθε δὲ µᾶλλον τὸν δυνάµενον καὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶµα ἀπολέσαι ἐν γεέννῃ; 
here, the verb ἀποκτεῖναι, apokteinai, to put to death is used in the same sense as in the 
previous example. (See also Anchor Bible Dictionary, p. 1937 on the second death) 
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To take this argument a bit further, the true limits of death-as-thanatos are, generally 
speaking, unattainable by humans, since they are not of this world. Notably, this is not 
specifically a Christian invention. We can find this thought expressed already in Plato’s 
Phaedo, where Socrates explains why “a man who has really spent his life in philosophy is 
naturally of good courage when he is to die, and has strong hopes that when he is dead he 
will attain the greatest blessings in that other land.” (2005, pp. 221-223) As philosopher 
Sarah Clift (2006) points out, this makes philosophy a “death-rehearsal” and philosophers 
“half-dead” since they have “always allied [themselves] to what does not pass away, change, or 
grow old.” (p. 21) This means that a physical death is not an obstacle for actualizing human 
potential, since this potential (in philosophy and in faith) always exceeds the limitations of 
the finite world. In this sense, death is not a passageway that turns subjects into objects: 
rather, it can elevate us beyond subjects and objects, to the world beyond this world where 
everything just is (which, in Jesus’ words, finds its opposite in the flames of hell that destroy 
everything (subjects, objects), leaving nothing behind). 
It is here where we can try articulate the difference between the secular and spiritual 
approaches to defeating death in terms the oscillation I mentioned in the beginning of this 
paper; that of, the oscillation between the concrete and the abstract death. 
As I pointed out earlier (but in different terms), the secularity embedded in defeating 
biological death is of a particular kind: it is materialistic in a sense that matter, in this case, 
human bodies (either living or dead), exists as separate entities (things, “relata” in Karen 
Barad’s terms). There is no distinction between an individual dead body (nekros) and death as 
such (thanatos): thus, defeating death automatically means defeating nekros (contra Jesus, who 
defeated thanatos). This does not mean, however, that every nekros would be treated as a 
singular event: going back to Povinelli, some deaths remain in the “broom closet.” In fact, for 
the Immortality Institute and others, nekros becomes treated like thanatos: it denotes a 
universalized individual human death,4 or more specifically, a death of an individual human 
agency akin to de Grey. This is why conquering death means, for the Immortality Institute 
and others likeminded, an ultimate manifestation of individual authorship over one’s life 
story, a transgression of nekros as a limit. Aging and dying bodies are problems to be cured, 
since, like viruses that infect the body, aging and death enter a truly living body from the 
outside; that is, they are not part of who we really are. 
This is, I believe, also the reason why curing death as nekros is not exclusive of the death of 
Others: like in Le Guin’s narrative of the child in the broom closet, a life that is excluded 
from the universality of truly living bodies is a life that is also excluded from the universality 
of nekros. A truly dead body (a body that counts) is nekros whose absence has a place among 
us. The death of Others remains outside this distribution of life and death, since they haven’t 
been fully alive. Their death belongs to the domain of sleep that is just sleep. 
 
 
 
                                               
4 Thacker (2011, pp. 108-109) points out that in Odyssey, nekros also means “the dead,” that 
is, “dead souls [that are] immaterial and yet not transcendent.” 
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Part 3: The End of All Things 
To sum up my argument thus far, I’ve tried to articulate what does it mean to approach death 
as a limit that could be, through material or spiritual means, overcome (that is, make it bend 
under our agency). The concreteness of nekros and the abstractness of thanatos pose us 
different tasks that, as I’ve argued, both lead us to a dead end (pun intended): they become 
universal limits that, like with any universalisms, are fundamentally exclusionary. Following 
Povinelli and Mbembe, there are people who are living in “death-worlds” (Mbembe’s term) 
where the conditions of possibility to live are deeply entangled with dying. Then, nekros isn’t 
a clear limit after all and, I believe, it is within these unclear limits where the question of 
agency and the seeming lack of it become politicized. While Christianity makes nekros 
secondary and seemingly equalizes us in the face of death, it does this by removing one’s true 
agency from this world and connecting it to the world beyond this world (that is, universal 
faith serves as the life-force beyond death). Interestingly enough, one can detect echoes of 
this approach also in de Grey’s secular claims that it is death (and not, for example, 
capitalism) as a physical-yet-transcendental force that hinders us from actualizing our true 
potential to live a good life (like Christians choose Jesus as the only viable choice, de Grey 
chooses life). Once the limits of death-as-thanatos are located in the transcendental realm, our 
whole life becomes a death-rehearsal where the rules of this rehearsal are simply informed to us 
(by an angel, a prophet, Milton Friedman, etc.…). 
So, how could we articulate these limits differently? As you might have noticed, thus far I’ve 
discussed death only in terms of how we humans might perceive it (concretely or abstractly). 
Going back to the beginning of this paper, however, this human perspective (if, in post-
metaphysical fashion, we count the transcendent as part of this perspective) is becoming 
increasingly insufficient when trying to understand life and death on Earth. I think there is 
something deeply bizarre that Google has launched Calico in times when the awareness of 
global warming (as the unnerving manifestation of the Anthropocene) and its possibly 
detrimental ecological consequences set limits to the future of the entire planet. And, as if 
they would purposely want to push the paradox even further, the death that they are trying to 
cure is first and foremost human death: the immortality of plants, animals, and other non-
human beings is completely absent from the discourse on infinite lifespans. 
This primacy of curing human death finds its strange parallel in Jesus’ warning about the 
second death, the death of the soul. After all, our anthropocentric world is a world where we 
are the soul of the Earth, its wise guardians. Since a body devoid of soul is just a body 
(organic matter, nekros), its destruction does not really count; what counts is the infinity of 
the soul (transcendent spirit, non-matter). If this soul dies, we’re left with nothing but the 
apocalyptic burning hell that so often depicts the end of the world. 
This deep entanglement of human finitude with the finitude of the world is probably one of 
the reasons why Immanuel Kant named his short text on the eschatological tendencies of 
human thought as “The End of All Things,” (1996) in which he noted that humans tend to 
expect the world to end because if something was created for a reason, this reason needs to be 
eventually fulfilled (that is, everything comes back to the One that created Many). He also 
argued that the end of the world remains ultimately incomprehensible to us, since it is beyond 
time and place, an ultimate limit to everything. Here, thanatos, the abstract death of humans, 
takes over “all things,” leaving nothing behind but celestial bodies whose infinity completes 
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the divine reason why matter existed in the first place. The world ends because we are 
destined to end. 
So, we need to ask again, how could we articulate the limits that death poses to life without 
universalizing our sense of finitude? While I don’t have a clear answer to this question (this is 
perhaps something that we can tackle together in this event), I see it requires that we inhabit 
the very limits that we are facing here, that of, the countless materialities of nekros and the 
deeply non-human characteristics of thanatos. Following philosopher Eugene Thacker, one 
possible way of inhabiting these limits is to turn to mysticism; not as a way to unite oneself 
with the transcendent, but to acknowledge the finitude of the world-for-us, that is, 
acknowledge that the world bears agencies that are completely unknown to us and 
incompatible with our agencies. In order to be very clear about what he means (and I mean), 
let’s quote him at length: 
If mysticism historically speaking aims for a total union of the division between self 
and world, then mysticism today would have to devolve upon the radical disjunction 
and indifference of self and world. If historical mysticism still had as its aims the 
subject’s experience, and as its highest principle that of God, then mysticism today – 
after the death of God – would be about the impossibility of experience, it would be 
about that which in shadows withdraws from any possible experience, and yet still 
makes its presence felt, through the periodic upheavals of weather, land, and matter. 
If historical mysticism is, in the last instance, theological, then mysticism today, a 
mysticism of the unhuman, would have to be, in the last instance, climatological. It is 
a kind of mysticism that can only be expressed in the dust of this planet. (Thacker, 
2011, pp. 158-159) 
Following Heraclitus, the “dust of this planet” is precisely “all things we see.” And, to line up 
Mbembe, this can also provide us with an approach to the politics of life and death quite 
different than what we have inherited from the philosophical discourse of modernity. 
 
 
References 
Amnesty International (2016). “This is what we die for”. Human rights abuses in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo power the global trade in cobalt. Retrieved from 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr62/3183/2016/en/. 
Clift, S. (2006). Narrative life span, in the wake. Polygraph, 18, 13-45. 
de Gray, A. (2004). The war on aging. In The Immortality Institute (Ed.), The scientific 
conquer of death (pp. 29-45). Retrieved from http://www.imminst.org/book. 
Kahn, C. H. (1981). The art and thought of Heraclitus: An edition of the fragments with 
translation and commentary. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Kant, I. (1996). The end of all things. In A. W. Wood & G. Di Giovanni (Ed.), Religion and 
rational theology (pp. 221-231). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Mbembe, A. (2003). Necropolitics. (L. Meintjes, Trans.). Public Culture, 15(1), 11-40. 
| Juuso Tervo | Death is all things we see awake | 
| Presented at Skills of Economy sessions, Kiasma Museum of Contemporary Art, February 20 2016 | 
 10 
Plato (2005). Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus. (H. M. Fowler, Trans.). 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Povinelli, E. A. (2008). The child in the broom closet: States of killing and letting die. South 
Atlantic Quarterly, 107(3), 509-530. 
Povinelli, E. A. (2011). Economies of abandonment: Social belonging and endurance in late 
liberalism. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 
Thacker, E. (2011). In the dust of this planet. Winchester, UK: Zero. 
Tucker, R. C. (1978). The Marx-Engels reader. New York, NY: Norton. 
